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to the same legislative end. What new element is added by the grant
of an ostensible option between this aggravated common-law liability
and the scheme of insurance or of liability without fault? The allow-
ance of a degree of latitude in the character and conditions of redress
indicates no change in the direction of the legislative purpose. This
is the more evident in view of the fact that the option granted, at least
so far as the employer is concerned, is not and is not intended to be a
real one, but the aggravated common-law liability is designed to coerce
the employer into the acceptance of the ostensible alternative. As
evidence of the dominant legislative intention this fictitious option
should not be regarded otherwise than as a penal sanction.
While the important consideration is that a consistent and -so far
as possible uniform theory of the workmen's compensation statutes
should prevail,20 it is submitted that this end can be best achieved by
starting with an interpretation which accords with the motives under-
lying the legislation. This requirement is clearly not met by the
contract theory unfortunately prevailing.
FURTHER LIMITATIONS UPON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
The decision of. the United States Supreme Court denying the tax-
ability of stock dividends as income under the Sixteenth Amendment'
aroused a fever of interest before it was announced, culminating in
the stock market flurry caused by the erroneous first report of it.
2
Since its announcement it has been the subject of extensive comment,
,both favorable and adverse.8 It seems, however, to have been rather
" See also Coxam-mr (1917) 27 YAi LAw Jou.=NA xi3.
1Eisner v. Macomber (ig9o, U. S.) 4o Sup. Ct I8g.
'See CommENT (ig2o) 29 YAix LAw JouAi, 678.
'See article by the writer hereof, Eisner v. Macomber (i920) 29 YA LAW
JouRNA , 735. The soundest suggestion for upholding any part of the tax upon
stock dividends is given by Professor Warren, Taxability of Stock Dizidends as
Income (i92o) 33 HARv. L REv. 885. In effect,it is that accrued increases in
value of capital items are taxable and that Congress has the power to state, and
has here stated, what shall be the test to show that such gains have accrued. But,
it may be suggested: (i) that, as Professor Warren states, this would at most
only sustain the tax so far as levied upon the increase in value taking place while
the recipient of the stock dividend holds the'stockl and would leave so little of the
actual statute left and so unfair a resulting situation as to make it questionable
whether any of the statute should be upheld under such conditions; (2) that
declaring of a stock dividend by no means signifies an increase in value to the
extent of the-book value of the stock dividend-that being the taxable amount
[Art. i545 of (919) U. S. Int. Rev., Reg. 45J-but is ordinarily a suggestion of a
present partial increase and an augury of further increase in market value; and
(3) that the detlaration of a stock dividend may conceivably be an expression of
the opinion of the directors of the corporation that an increase in value has taken
place, but is no more an actual realization of a monetary gain to the stockholder
than a raise in a tax assessment by a board of assessors is such a realization to
the taxpayer.
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generally thought a blow to government revenues.' A few weeks
later the same Court without apparently stirring a ripple of interest
announced a decision which to the mind of the writer hereof -will mean
an infinitely greater loss in revenue to the government and will have
an infinitely greater effect upon our scheme of income taxation as a
whole. In Evans v. Gore (1920, U. S.) 40 Sup. Ct. 55o, which decided
that the salary of a federal judge was not taxable as income, the
,court finally settled decisively that the Sixteenth Amendment added
no new fields of taxation to those within the power of the federal gov-
ernment and expressly placed beyond the reach of that government all
income received either as salary or interest on indebtedness from the
various states and their local subdivisions. The opinion was by
Justice Van Devanter. Justice Holmes filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Brandeis concurred.
There are two possible reasons for the lack of interest in this
case: one was that the particular question involved, recovery by a
federal judge of an income tax paid upon his salary, was of course
of limited scope and the larger question was only to be perceived upon
a study of the opinion; and the other was that many have doubtless
felt the non-taxability of state securities to be well settled. More-
over, the particular question also involved a consideration of another
point, namely the effect of the constitutional prohibition against
diminishing the compensation of a federal judge during his continuance
in office.5
It is true that the history of the Sixteenth Amendment and the
decisions under it gave much ground for this belief 'as to the question
of the taxability by the federal government of income received from
a state or its subdivisions. 6 Prior to the Amendment it had been held,
apparently without serious conflict of opinion, that as the power to tax
was the power to destroy, Congress had no power of taxation over
any instrumentalities of a state.7 When the Sixteenth Amendment
was proposed to the states, Governor Hughes of New York asked
the' assembly of that state to reject it on the ground that it gave such
'That the effect of Eisner v. Macomber, supra, upon government receipts will
not in the long run necessarily be large, see (i92o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAI, 738.
5 Art. III, sec. i, of the Constitution. The salary of the President is subject to
a similar safeguard. Art. II, sec. i, cl. 6. The same question is there involved.
'See (i2o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 735, 740, 741. See also A. C. Ritchie,
Power of Congress to Tax State Securities, (1919) 5 Am. BAR Ass'N. JOUR. 602;
cf. Harry Hubbard, The Sixteenth Amendment, (920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 794.
"Collector v. Day (870, U. S.) ii Wall. 113, 114 (state salaries not taxable);
United States v. Baltinwre & Ohio Ry. (1872, U. S.) i7 Wall. 322 (municipal
bonds not taxable; two justices dissenting, one justice abstaining from decision) ;
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (i895) 157 U. S. 429, i5 Sup. Ct. 673,
(895) 158 U. S. 6oi, 15 Sup. Ct. 912, Ambrosina v. United States (i9o2) 187
U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 12; Farmer's, etc., Bank v. Minnesota (1914) 232 U. S. 5V6,
34 Sup. Ct. 354. Cf. South Carolina v. United States (i9o5) 199 U. S. 437, 26
Sup. Ct. ii, upholding a tax upon a non-governmental agency of a state.
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power to Congress and thus jeopardized the future existence of the
states. This called forth so much adverse comment at the time as
to lead the Supreme Court in the principal case to say that "the
apprehension was effectively dispelled and ratification followed." And
finally the Supreme Court has previously said in several cases that
the Amendment gave no new taxing power to Congress, but merely
removed a disability that hindered the method of levying a certain
kind of tax.8 Nevertheless, the question could not be considered
definitely settled until a decision had expressly considered the point,
for there had been some noteworthy accord with Governor Hughes'
views,' and the question had been considered so far open that it was
debated in Congress at the time when the income tax bill of 1918 was
under consideration. 10 Only last spring a powerful argument was
made in a law review article for the position now repudiated by the
majority of the Court, and its reasoning was accepted in toto by the
dissenting justices."
It was necessary for the Court to pass upon this matter, since it
first came to the conclusion, discussed hereafter, that under the
original Constitution the salaries of the federal judges could not be
subject to an income tax.1 2  Then the question arose whether the
Sixteenth Amendment by referring to "incomes from whatever source
derived" 1' had given such additional power to the federal government,
8Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. (1916) 240 U. S. I, 36 Sup. Ct. 236; Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 1O3, 36 Sup. Ct. 278; Peck v. Lowe (19x8)
247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432. See Ballantine, Constitutional Aspects of the
Excess Profits Tax (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 625. 628, and cf. comment on
these cases as dicta by Hubbard, op. cit. supra, note 6.
'Citations are given in Ritchie, op. cit. supra, note 6. See Professor R. C.
Minor, The Proposed Income Tax Amendment (igio) 15 VA. LAW REG. 737, 753;
A. C. Graves, Inherent Improprieties in the Income Tix Amendment (191o) 19
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 505, 528; Governor A. E. Willson of Kentucky, The Income
Tax Amendment (191) 43 CHI. LEG. NEWS, 251, quoting from a letter of
Governor Hughes.
10 The House supported such a measure, but the Senate did not. See Ritchie,
op. cit. supra, note 6. The language of the present Act, however, is broad
enough to include incomes from salaries of state and local officials and appar-
ently in the view of the Senate Finance Committee the constittitional question
was to be raised. Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure, (1920) 268, 269. The
Attorney General has, however, ruled against the collection of a tax on such
income. (1919) 31 Op. Atty. Gen. 441. Senator Knox supported the constitu-
tionality of a tax on the income of state securities under the war powers of the
government. Cong. Rec. (65th Cong., 2d sess.) 11854, 11859-ii86i. See argu-
ments contra of Senator Kellogg, id. 12179, and of Professor Taft, id. 12451.
11 Hubbard, op. cit. supra, note 6.
"Under the provisions cited in note 5, supra.
""The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration." The words in italics did not
appear in the original amendment proposed in Congress, but the wording was,
"direct taxes upon incomes." See Hubbard, op. cit. supra, note 6.
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a question the answer to which, as the court expressly states, decides
the question of the taxability of all incomes received from the states. 1
Quite probably the words quoted from the Amendment were inserted
in part at least to blot out all distinctions between incomes from dif-
ferent sources. The famous Pollock case had suggested such dis-
tinctions, stating that a tax on the gains or profits from business,
privileges, or employments as distinguished from income from real
and personal property and the like, might be sustained as an "excise
tax." 5 Nevertheless, there is nothing in such history to demand a
decision that these words add nothing to the previous definitions by
the Court of taxable income. On the contrary, the ordinary meaning
of the all-inclusive words used would seem to demand the opposite con-
struction, namely one including all kinds of income, no matter from
what source derived. The decision unduly limits the words used in
the Amendment, a limitation which it attempts to justify by defining
the purpose of the Amendment as in effect to remove the restrictions
stated in the Pollock case, i. e. the requirement of apportionment.
It is submitted that there is nothing in this historical background to
make nedessary the attributing of such a limited purpose to the
framers of the Amendment and to require the consequent restriction
of the plain language of the Amendment. The arguments to be drawn
from certain facts, namely, that the Pollock case also held taxes upon
municipal bonds invalid, and that the wording of the amendment was
changed in Congress to include the broader designation of income,
point the other way.18
There is another view which lends weight to a contrary construc-
tion of the Amendment and even makes doubtful the court's view of
the law irrespective of the Amendment. That is the question how far
for the purpose of a tax figured on a general balance struck after
adding all gains and subtracting all proper deductions for the year
it is possible or permissible to consider such balance as composed of
items from separate sources. As Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent puts
it, at some point money received as salary loses its specific character
as such and becomes intermingled with the general funds of the owner.
Thus, if put into a house, the house of the judge is not tax-exempt,
"Since, in the view of the cases cited in note 7, supra, such income was taxable,
if at all, only under the Sixteenth Amendment.
" See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (i895) 158 U. S. 6oi, 635, x5 Sup.
Ct. 912, 920.
"8 It should be remembered that in the Pollock case the Court held, five to four,
that taxes on income from property were direct taxes and hence required equal
apportionment, and further held unanimously that taxes on income from state
securities were beyond the power of Congress. The Act under consideration
there was improper for both reasons. The latter portion of the Sixteenth
Amendment would remove the first objection, while the words in italics, espe-
cially in view of the change from the original form proposed (see note 13,
supra), would be surplusage unless they remove the second objection.
COMMENTS
and so if converted into other things subject to taxation, e. g. playing
cards subject to the federal government's excise tax. There seems
to be no reason why a man's income may not be treated as one entire
fund for the year, and it is reasonable to suppose an intention of the
framers of the Amendment to do away with all questions of its
derivation so long only as it is income.
This argument had been well developed -by the government to meet
the contention that the tax violated the Constitution because it dimin-
ished the judge's compensation during his term of office, and it had
met with the approval of the lower court.17 Moreover the Attorney
General in a well-reasoned opinion given last year had argued that
the tax, at most, had "increased the cost of living by creating a new
obligation of citizenship, to the discharge of which a part of the
salaries must be devoted.""' Here, too, admitting all that the majority
say as to the vital necessity of an independent judiciary, it seems hard
to justify their construction of the constitutional provision as to the
diminishing of compensation. They properly hold it was intended
primarily for the benefit of the public to secure a proper judiciary,
and was not designed for the benefit of the individual judges. Hence
the purpose involved was to prevent any legislative attacks upon the
judges' livelihood which might render them subservient to that branch
of the government. It is difficult to see how the distribution of the
burdens of government over all the citizenry without discrimination is
going to have any particular effect in destroying the independence of
the judiciary.' 9
Such a view of income as a blended mass the Court had tended to
foster by certain of its decisions under the Amendment. Thus it had
held that a tax levied upon the income of a corporation of which more
than two thirds was derived from exports did not violate the pro-
'Evans v. Gore (1919, N. D. Ky.) 262 Fed. 55o, approved in (192O) 18 MICH.
L. Rxv. 698.
' (919) 3i Op. Atty. Gen. 475, 484. The Attorney General, as well as counsel
for the government and the court below, had felt it necessary to concede, in view
of the cases cited in note 8, supra, that the Sixteenth Amendment gave no new
taxing power to Congress. The dissent indicates that the concession was unwise.
See citations in notes 17 and i8, supra, and see especially 262 Fed. 552. The
Supreme Court's construction of section i of Article III appears to coincide with
the views of Chief Justice Taney, expressed in a letter of protest to the Secretary
of the Treasury, (1863) 157 U. S. 701; with the opinion of Attorney General
Hoar, (i869) 13 Op. Atty. Gen. i6i; and with the views of Mr. Justice Field in
the Pollock case, (894) 157 U. S. 429, 6o4-6o6, IS Sup. Ct. 673, 698-699. The
decisions in the state courts on similar constitutional provisions are conflicting.
Authorities are collected in (I919) 3r Op. Atty. Gen. 475, and in State ex rel.
Wickham v. Nygaard (1915) I59 Wis. 396, I5O N. W. 513, holding that the Wis-
consin income tax did not diminish the salary of a public officer during his term
of office. Since the decision in the principal case, the acting Attorney General
has ruled that the salaries of federal ,judges appointed after the passage of the
Revenue Act of I918 are subject to the income tax levied by that Act. (i92o)
32 Op. Atty. Gen. 248.
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hibition against a tax on exports.20  A similar rule was announced
as to interstate commerce.21 The Court's differentiation of these cases
is that an income tax laid, not on gross receipts, but on net proceeds
remaining after all expenses were paid and losses adjusted, does not
directly burden-the business, but only indirectly and remotely affects
it. It does not seem clear why an indirect and remote effect is not
permissible in one class of cases while it is in another.
2 2
The effects of the Court's broad holding are serious. Not merely
is a large and growing field of revenue shown to be beyond the reach
of the federal government, but the whole present scheme of federal
income taxation with its surtaxes increasing with the amount of
income, is impracticable. The resulting effects upon business in gen-
eral and upon such especially acute situations as the present lack of
housing cannot be underestimated. Why should one possessing capital
invest in real estate mortgages to enable a would-be householder to
build, when vastly more return may be obtained from a municipal
bond ?23 The whole incentive of this situation is to turn capital from
fields vitally necessary to everyone to fields of public works. Such
works in part at least are of course desirable, but many forms of
public works are non-productive and the greater security involved in
investments of this character has under ordinary conditions made them
sufficiently attractive to investors. To make them still more attractive
is to place an incentive on goVernmental extravagance-at the expense
of productive forms of business, and at the same time the whole
theory that he who has the greater income must share a greater portion
of the burden of government falls to the ground, for he invests in
tax-exempt securities.24
The outlook for a change in this situation is dark. The only pos-
sible change is by another constitutional amendment, and the prospects
of securing the passage of such an amendment against the opposition
of the states seems slight. The only compensating feature of the
situation is in the notice thus given the government that the field of
income taxation is not limitless and that the burdens of government
must be reduced.
C. E. C.
"Peck & Co. v. Lowe (ig8) 247 U. S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432; cf. (igi8) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, io96.
= United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct. 499.
= See Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority (1gI) 32 HAMW. L.
REv. 9o2, 926-928; also 262 Fed. 554.
'Under the present federal income tax a 4/2 per cent tax-free bond yields
as much net income to a person possessing income exceeding $4o,ooo as a taxable
security paying 6.o8 per cent. The rate increases until in the case of persons
with incomes of over $i,oooooo the 4Y per cent tax-free bond is as profitable
as a security yielding 16.67 per cent. Kahn, Two Years of Faulty Taxation
'(920) 14, 15.'Obviously federal securities must be kept tax-free in order t6 compete with
the state and muaicipal securities.
